Harnessing Growth Poles for Poverty Reduction and Climate Resilience in Zambia

Zambia is increasingly exposed to climate-related shocks, particularly droughts and floods, which continue to undermine agricultural productivity, household welfare, and long-term development. In response, geographically concentrated investments – referred to as growth poles – have been promoted as engines of pro-poor growth and resilience. However, evidence of their effectiveness is limited. This study examines whether and how growth poles contribute to poverty reduction and climate resilience using a mixed-methods approach that combines nationally representative spatial data from Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys, panel data on poverty trajectories from the Rural and Agricultural Livelihood Survey, and qualitative evidence from focus group discussions, life histories, and key informant interviews conducted across selected growth pole districts, including including farm blocks, mining areas, national parks, and sugar estates.

The findings show that growth poles can stimulate economic activity and generate new livelihood opportunities, but their impacts are uneven and context-specific. Agro-industrial growth poles, particularly sugar estates, exhibit the strongest poverty outcomes due to deeper integration with local production systems and labour markets. Mining areas generate significant economic dynamism and employment opportunities, but benefits are uneven, often accruing to individuals with higher skills, capital, or social connections, including migrants. In contrast, farm blocks and national parks show persistently high poverty levels, reflecting limited infrastructure, restricted access to productive resources, and the seasonal or unstable nature of available opportunities.

Proximity to growth poles does not automatically translate into improved welfare. Only a small share of households live close to these investments, and poverty remains high even among nearby communities. In some cases, households located in intermediate zones (21–60km from growth poles) exhibit better poverty outcomes than those closest to growth poles, suggesting that spillover benefits – such as improved market access – extend beyond core investment areas while avoiding congestion and rising living costs. Growth poles contribute to livelihood diversification, which is a key pathway to resilience. Households engaged in non-farm employment, enterprise activities, and diversified income portfolios are better able to cope with climatic shocks. However, the resilience benefits of diversification depend on the quality and stability of these opportunities. In many cases, growth pole-linked employment is informal, low paid, and seasonal, limiting its ability to provide sustained protection against shocks.

A central finding is that growth poles generate selective rather than broad-based welfare gains. Households with greater amounts of assets, more education, and more developed social networks are better positioned to benefit from employment, contracts, and supply opportunities. As a result, growth poles contribute to localised economic transformation while reinforcing socioeconomic differentiation. Importantly, households that do not benefit are not necessarily worse off than before, but experience more limited gains relative to others, reflecting uneven inclusion rather than absolute decline. The study also finds that growth poles do not automatically enhance climate resilience. In some contexts, particularly mining aeras and farm blocks, resilience has declined over time due to unstable livelihoods, continued reliance on climate-sensitive agriculture, and structural constraints such as limited land access and weak market integration.

Policy implications emphasise the need for complementary interventions. Strengthening household asset bases is critical for enabling participation in growth pole economies and enhancing resilience. Improving access to appropriately structured finance – particularly for productive investment – can support livelihood upgrading, though grant-based support remains necessary for poorer households. Promoting diversification must be accompanied by efforts to improve the quality and stability of non-farm employment. Strengthening local participation in supply chains is essential to ensure that growth pole demand benefits surrounding communities. Finally, extending investments beyond core growth pole areas can enhance spillover benefits and support more inclusive regional development.

Overall, growth poles have the potential to contribute to poverty reduction and climate resilience, but only when they are supported by policies that expand access to opportunities and address underlying structural inequalities. Without such measures, their benefits are likely to remain localised and uneven.

Authors: Mary Lubungu, Benny Kabwela, Brian Mulenga, Richard Bwalya, Arthur Moonga

Transforming Climate and Socioeconomic Resilience among Poor and Vulnerable Rural and Urban Households in Zambia

Front cover of policy brief

Zambia faces a dual challenge of persistent poverty and escalating climate risks, particularly droughts and floods, which increasingly disrupt livelihoods, infrastructure, and macroeconomic stability. This policy brief synthesises findings from a comprehensive policy and programme analysis examining how national frameworks address climate adaptation, disaster risk management, and social protection. The analysis indicates that Zambia has developed a robust policy architecture anchored in Vision 2030, the Eighth National Development Plan, and the National Adaptation Plan. However, systemic gapsremain in financing, coordination, data integration, and implementation effectiveness.

Resilience (defined here as the capacity of households to recover from shocks) is typically achieved by households at high levels of welfare. The key question is how policies and public action can help households at lower levels of welfare to achieve higher degrees of resilience.

While notable progress has been achieved through institutional reforms, early warning systems, climate-smart agriculture initiatives, and digital social registries, resilience investments are fragmented and predominantly donor driven. The transition from reactive crisis response towards anticipatory, risk-informed governance is underway but incomplete. Rural populations remain highly exposed due to reliance on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources, while urban vulnerabilities are rising, with rapid informal settlement growth and infrastructure deficits.

This brief proposes consolidating existing frameworks into a national resilience strategy, supported by predictable financing, integrated data systems, greater capacity at local level, and strengthened accountability mechanisms. Embedding resilience within fiscal policy, incentivising private sector engagement, and enhancing subnational and, especially, community-level (first responder) implementation capacity are central to achieving sustainable outcomes.

Authors: Bridget Bwalya, Richard Bwalya, Vidya Diwakar, Felix Kalaba, Lukonga Luwabelwa, Arthur Moonga, Kate Pruce, Andrew Shepherd, and Marja Hinfelaar. Reviewed by Herrick Mwewa, Ministry of Green Economy, Republic of Zambia.

Let's go double dipping! Supporting Growth from Below through Cash+

In Zambia, economic growth is primarily driven by large-scale, formal investments in sectors such as minerals, tourism, and services. However, these sectors employ relatively few people and have a limited impact on overall poverty reduction due to weak economic multipliers.

Consequently, Zambia needs complementary efforts focused on “Growth from Below”, small- scale, informal investments at the household level to effectively reduce poverty, particularly in an economy characterised by high inequality and a heavy reliance on minerals. According to the World Bank (2025), Zambia’s economic growth has a minimal effect on poverty alleviation, meaning that even substantial economic growth results in only modest reductions in poverty levels. While governments typically prioritise large-scale investments, a balanced approach that promotes both Growth from Above (GfA) and Growth from Below (GfB) is essential for inclusive and sustainable poverty reduction.

Furthermore, although the minerals sector is economically significant, it inadequately contributes to government revenues due to externalization of financial flows and opaque financial practices on which significant Zambian institutional capacity has been built (Inter-governmental Forum, 2025). Mineral companies are sometimes able to negotiate special agreements with the Ministry of Finance and Planning to minimise or evade taxes and royalties, as in the recent dropping of a 15% export tax. Addressing these transparency and taxation issues, which have long been a concern for the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), is crucial to ensure that revenues from mineral wealth are effectively directed towards supporting broader economic initiatives that can genuinely benefit all Zambians.

Written by Andrew Shepherd

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Dimensions of Urban Poverty in Zambia: Insights, Challenges and Policy Directions

This study, conducted between May and July 2024, provides empirical evidence on urban poverty among men and women in Lusaka and Ndola. Using a qualitative case study approach, it engaged diverse stakeholders – including informal sector workers, local government officials, district social welfare officers, and civil society representatives – to offer a comprehensive understanding of urban poverty and inform policy recommendations. Data was collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews, ensuring a multi-stakeholder perspective on the lived realities and structural drivers of urban poverty. 

Despite Zambia’s resource wealth and its status as one of Africa’s most urbanised nations, urban poverty is widespread. With 40 per cent of Zambia’s 19.6 million people residing in cities, poverty affects 31.9 per cent of urban dwellers – an increase from 23.4 per cent in 2015. This trend underscores the urgent need for targeted antipoverty strategies. While many individuals display resilience, they face persistent challenges such as income instability, food insecurity, inadequate health care, limited educational opportunities and poor housing conditions, all of which undermine their wellbeing and economic agency. 

Authored by Cleopas Gabriel Sambo

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Rural Pathways out of Poverty in Zambia

Poverty rates are high in Zambia, with the incidence of poverty having increased from 54.4 per cent in 2015 to 60.0 per cent in 2022 (ZamStats 2023). This overall trend hides variations according to area of residence and socio-demographic characteristics. For example, poverty is largely a rural rather than an urban phenomenon, with the incidence of poverty in rural areas estimated at 78.8 per cent compared with 31.9 per cent for urban areas as of 2022 (ibid.). Poverty is also more prevalent among female-headed households (83.4 per cent) compared with male-headed households (77.3 per cent). Comparisons between 2015 and 2022 shows that the proportionate increase in poverty rates was higher among female-headed households (4.5 per cent) compared with male-headed households (0.7 per cent). Poverty in Zambia is also associated with the livelihood strategies that households pursue. For instance, poverty is highest among those employed in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors, increasing from 63.9 per cent in 2015 to 64.7 per cent in 2022 (ibid.).

This working paper aims to synthesise evidence on pathways out of rural poverty for the Government of Zambia and other stakeholders. It uses mixed-methods evidence on rural poverty graduation pathways in Zambia, categorising these pathways into three groups: (1) chronically and extremely poor people escaping poverty, (2) moderately poor people escaping poverty, and (3) vulnerable non-poor people maintaining their escape from poverty. This report uses recent quantitative data from 2015 to early 2022, capturing the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact on mobility. The life history qualitative analysis extends this further through to November 2023, incorporating the effects of inflation, and the new administration’s social protection and promotion policies. Thus, we can more effectively cover the role of social protection and exit ramps for those receiving social cash transfers (SCTs) while taking into account the most recent impact of climate change on these rural pathways out of poverty.

Authored by Lucia da Corta, Richard Bwalya

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Evidence From Cash Plus Programmes: Lessons for Zambia

Social protection strategies, and cash transfer programmes in particular, have been on the rise globally since the early 2000s. By 2019, 35 African countries had adopted a national social protection policy or strategy. Cash plus approaches (including graduation programmes) addressing a wider range of socioeconomic outcomes emerged more recently and have expanded quickly. The Zambian government approved a cash plus approach in 2022, and a range of cash plus interventions are already being implemented. Exploring cash plus experiences and evidence from other countries is key to informing programme development, with a focus on what we can learn from these contexts that is relevant for Zambia. This includes ‘what works’ in terms of different combinations of cash plus components as well as how to deliver through national and local governance structures.

Authored by Roz Price, Kate Pruce and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler

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Political Economy Analysis of Pro-poor Policies in Zambia

In 2024, Zambia experienced the driest agricultural season in over 40 years, with significant crop losses, increased livestock deaths and, consequently, worsening poverty. Over 9 million people in 84 out of 116 districts were affected. Rising inflation impeded access to food for vulnerable households Being dependent on hydropower, the drought resulted in an enormous power deficit. In 2024 and early 2025 Zambia experienced power cuts of 21 hours a day, disproportionately affecting small and medium-sized enterprises that cannot afford solar power or generators.

A debt crisis has exacerbated these climate-related challenges. Zambian debt peaked at 140 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020. Along with Covid-19, debt service pressures resulted in Zambia becoming the first African country to default on its external debt service obligations in November 2020, missing a US$42.5 million interest payment on a Eurobond. In addition, Zambia has been hit by three droughts in the past decade. Due to the deaths of two presidents in office (in 2008 and 2014), Zambia has also seen high levels of political turnover, which has impacted policy consistency.

The multiple crises Zambia has faced have had political repercussions, as economic decline has created discontent. The economic effects of crises have further strained the kwacha and resulted in increased inflationary pressures.2 Zambia is under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme that has strict benchmarks when it comes to subsidies for fuel, electricity and fertiliser. This programme ends in August 2025, opening various policy options, though it will lack the fiscal space which gave President Levy Mwanawasa’s free reign after the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative in 2006. The forthcoming elections in August 2026 will be tightly contested; if the opposition can unite behind one candidate, it will also influence policy decisions.

Within this context, this working paper discusses the following questions: How can poverty reduction experience a step change in Zambia? What are the political and economic conditions? And what can research tell the competing political parties and how best to achieve change The paper will briefly focus on the anti-poverty measures undertaken by the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) government (2011–21), which started as a leftist movement, before zooming into the current United Party for National Development (UPND) regime, which is more liberal in outlook. It then focuses on the political economy of current pro-poor programming. The paper is based on a literature review, unpublished reports, and interviews and interactions with relevant stakeholders (government officials, civil society organisations, think tanks and analysts).

Authored by Marja Hinfelaar

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Understanding the dynamics of poverty in Rwanda

Overview

While poverty rates in Rwanda have fallen significantly since the 2000s, the latest estimates reveal a slowdown in the poverty reduction rate. This calls for a better understanding of poverty and poverty dynamics in the country. In this paper, we use the latest three waves of Rwandan panel data, collected in 2010/11, 2013/14 and 2016/17, to characterise the dynamics of poverty in Rwanda and explain the slowdown in poverty reduction. Our results show that education, health insurance, diversification of occupations within households and savings all promote escape out of poverty and prevent impoverishment. The Girinka Programme acts as a lift out of poverty, while business creation has protective effect against impoverishment. Observed trends of these variables, especially the increase in households depending on agriculture wages and the reduction of business owners at the household level, appear as important factors in the slowdown in poverty reduction in Rwanda.

Authors: ODI & IPAR

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What to do about the slowdown in poverty reduction?

Key points

• Rwanda had been a stellar performer in poverty reduction until recently. Many of the gains were the result of government policies and programmes, but some of these programmes also have unintended consequences which need to be reviewed.

• The slowdown in poverty reduction during the 2010s has been driven by fewer escapes from poverty, the challenges people face in sustaining escapes, greater impoverishment as well as continued chronic poverty.

• In Rwanda, as elsewhere, escaping poverty and then staying out of it is mainly possible due to ‘growth from below’, and the government has been promoting this, especially in agriculture. Since around 2012, the government’s main growth thrust has been in promoting ‘growth from above’ as well as continued support to smallholder agriculture, and this has achieved significant improvements in infrastructure, the business environment and investment, as well as productivity growth in farming.

• In reviewing the poverty effects of economic transformation, a better balance between support for growth from below and growth from above is needed, especially in the nonfarm rural economy and the urban informal sector. More comprehensive and better enabling conditions for growth from below would allow more poor people to participate in and benefit from growth. • Reviews of the following issues are needed: the reasons why the rural nonfarm economy is relatively underdeveloped; the unintended consequences of a number of regulations affecting small and micro-enterprises as well as smallholder agriculture; and the unintended consequences of a raft of policies which demand cost recovery from poor and vulnerable households, limiting the savings and investments these households can make.

• Current efforts to make cities more inclusive through city Master Plans are excellent and should be pursued with vigour. This could provide a model for the other reviews suggested above.

• Rwanda’s unique health insurance scheme provides exceptional protection against ill-health as a source of impoverishment. The government and development partners could acknowledge the other sources of impoverishment – including loss of livelihood due to environmental hazards as well as the policy emphasis on cost recovery – and address these more resolutely. The loss of male labour in households where there is separation, divorce or widowhood is a further source of impoverishment, and while the government has made strenuous efforts to enhance the rights of married women in such situations, unmarried women in informal or polygamous unions are less protected.

• There has been significant progress in increasing the numbers of children enrolling in school. However, education costs are significant components of household budgets, even for poor people. Reducing or eliminating these costs through significantly increased public expenditure on education and providing children from poor families with the means to continue through secondary education would contribute significantly towards reducing poverty both now and intergenerationally.

• There are two main sources of chronic poverty: gender inequalities resulting in disadvantaged women-headed households, and the growing dependence of the poorest Rwandans on casual agricultural labour. Extending the protections currently available to married women to unmarried cohabiting and polygamously married women, as well as further measures to tighten the labour market to complement refreshed minimum wage legislation, are potential ways forward. Such measures could include implementing and extending the minimum social protection package to promote graduation from protection and social cohesion.

Author: Andrew Shepherd

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Leave No One Behind in progress to the Sustainable Development Goals: Priority actions for governments by 2020

The 2014–15 Chronic Poverty Report: the road to zero extreme poverty argued that three objectives had to be achieved to get to zero poverty: chronic poverty had to be tackled; impoverishment had to be stopped; and escapes from poverty needed to be sustained. The report identified 14 policy areas that could be critical for the eradication of extreme poverty and leaving no one behind in the process. These can also be clustered into four pillars: human development, pro-poorest growth, transformative social change and resilience.

This paper provides a reasonably comprehensive basis for identifying policies that will contribute to leaving no one behind, since the chronically poor are, by definition, those who are getting left behind in the process of development. Of course, among the chronically poor are those who are able to make progress and sustain escapes from poverty; there are also those who are stuck on the consumption floor, which has barely moved in several decades, some of whom may be experiencing ‘intersecting inequalities’ (those pertaining to different attributes like age, religion, gender, embodied in the same person) – or, in simpler terms, those who experience multiple disadvantages.

This paper explores context through a re-categorisation of countries using income levels, institutional fragility and progress on poverty, and an analysis of countries’ policy frameworks in 2015. It then explores the above priorities in context, and in each policy area outlines key measures that will underpin progress and enhance access for the poorest and most marginalised.

The aim of this analysis is to stimulate debate as to what policy mix is appropriate, necessary and desirable in different country circumstances. Once policies have been selected, policy consistency over time, as well as their sequencing; cross-government coordination to ensure delivery of the right combinations; and multi-stakeholder partnerships for implementation are indispensable tools to reach the objective of LNOB and achieve the SDGs for all. Governments vary in the extent to which they have such mechanisms in place and allow them to influence policy and implementation.

Authors: Andrew Shepherd and Kate Bird with Moizza Binat Sarwar

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