Making Zambia's Growth Poles More Inclusive

Zambia continues to face increasing climate variability and shocks especially droughts, floods, and cyclones. These undermine agricultural and energy production, with subsequent negative impacts on food and water security, incomes, and livelihoods. Zambia’s national development strategies prioritise geographically targeted investments or ‘growth poles’ in agriculture, mining, tourism, and manufacturing, which are intended to serve as engines of pro-poor growth.

This policy brief synthesises evidence on whether growth poles – particularly mining areas, sugar estates, farm blocks including agro-processing yards, tourism areas, and industrial yards – contribute to poverty reduction and climate resilience in Zambia, and proposes policy measures that are needed to strengthen the poverty reduction and resilience-building effects of growth poles. It draws on nationally representative panel data – the 2012, 2015, and 2019 Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Survey (RALS), and the 2022 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) – complemented by spatial analysis and extensive qualitative fieldwork.

Authors: Andrew Shepherd, Mary Lubungu, Cleopas Sambo, Benny Kabwela, Richard Bwalya, Arthur Moonga, Vidya Diwakar and Herrick Mwewa

System Strengthening for Climate Resilience

Zambia experienced a severe drought characterised by a record-breaking dry spell from January to March 2024 (Zambia Society Trust 2024; WFP 2024a). The drought affected eight out of Zambia’s ten provinces, with the greatest impact in Southern, Central, Eastern, North-Western, Western, and Lusaka Provinces (Figure 1). Reports suggest that the drought during the 2023/24 agricultural season was the worst in 40 years (DMMU 2024 OCHA 2024; WFP 2024; Mwape et al. 2025), placing millions of households at heightened risk of hunger and destitution. The drought’s ripple effects (WFP 2024b; ACAPS 2025) included: crop and livestock losses; food shortages; reduced water supply; outbreaks of cholera and diarrhoea tied to diminished access to clean water; and widespread and frequent load shedding and energy shortages lasting well into 2025. Furthermore, the drought had macro-economic effects (including inflation, and reduced growth, revenues, and debt repayment capacity), and potentially political effects in the sense that the upcoming election in August 2026 may be influenced by perceptions on how the government handled the drought response.

Authors: Jeremy Allouche, Bridget Bwalya, Richard Bwalya, Vidya Diwakar, Felix Kalaba, Lukonga Luwabelwa, Arthur Moonga, Kate Pruce, Andrew Shepherd, and Marja Hinfelaar

Transforming Climate and Socioeconomic Resilience among Poor and Vulnerable Rural and Urban Households in Zambia

Front cover of policy brief

Zambia faces a dual challenge of persistent poverty and escalating climate risks, particularly droughts and floods, which increasingly disrupt livelihoods, infrastructure, and macroeconomic stability. This policy brief synthesises findings from a comprehensive policy and programme analysis examining how national frameworks address climate adaptation, disaster risk management, and social protection. The analysis indicates that Zambia has developed a robust policy architecture anchored in Vision 2030, the Eighth National Development Plan, and the National Adaptation Plan. However, systemic gapsremain in financing, coordination, data integration, and implementation effectiveness.

Resilience (defined here as the capacity of households to recover from shocks) is typically achieved by households at high levels of welfare. The key question is how policies and public action can help households at lower levels of welfare to achieve higher degrees of resilience.

While notable progress has been achieved through institutional reforms, early warning systems, climate-smart agriculture initiatives, and digital social registries, resilience investments are fragmented and predominantly donor driven. The transition from reactive crisis response towards anticipatory, risk-informed governance is underway but incomplete. Rural populations remain highly exposed due to reliance on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources, while urban vulnerabilities are rising, with rapid informal settlement growth and infrastructure deficits.

This brief proposes consolidating existing frameworks into a national resilience strategy, supported by predictable financing, integrated data systems, greater capacity at local level, and strengthened accountability mechanisms. Embedding resilience within fiscal policy, incentivising private sector engagement, and enhancing subnational and, especially, community-level (first responder) implementation capacity are central to achieving sustainable outcomes.

Authors: Bridget Bwalya, Richard Bwalya, Vidya Diwakar, Felix Kalaba, Lukonga Luwabelwa, Arthur Moonga, Kate Pruce, Andrew Shepherd, and Marja Hinfelaar. Reviewed by Herrick Mwewa, Ministry of Green Economy, Republic of Zambia.

Learning from Cash Plus: A Summary of Evidence

This paper aims to provide an evidence base for what works best in terms of cash plus programmes, referring to approaches that combine cash transfers with additional inputs, interventions and support to amplify the effects of the transfers. As a desk-based review, it draws on secondary literature, including existing studies and evaluations. The paper identifies different potential cash plus combinations and delivery models, emphasising that cash plus and graduation are not directly interchangeable. The paper then presents and discusses existing evidence of cash plus approaches and impacts across a range of sectors: nutrition, health, women’s empowerment, livelihoods and assets. Drawing on the evidence base and wider literature, the paper identifies key lessons for countries adopting or expanding cash plus programmes, focusing on policy-level factors, basic building blocks and programme-level factors, and supply-side factors.

Written by Kate Pruce, Roz Price and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler

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Rural Pathways out of Poverty in Zambia

Poverty rates are high in Zambia, with the incidence of poverty having increased from 54.4 per cent in 2015 to 60.0 per cent in 2022 (ZamStats 2023). This overall trend hides variations according to area of residence and socio-demographic characteristics. For example, poverty is largely a rural rather than an urban phenomenon, with the incidence of poverty in rural areas estimated at 78.8 per cent compared with 31.9 per cent for urban areas as of 2022 (ibid.). Poverty is also more prevalent among female-headed households (83.4 per cent) compared with male-headed households (77.3 per cent). Comparisons between 2015 and 2022 shows that the proportionate increase in poverty rates was higher among female-headed households (4.5 per cent) compared with male-headed households (0.7 per cent). Poverty in Zambia is also associated with the livelihood strategies that households pursue. For instance, poverty is highest among those employed in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors, increasing from 63.9 per cent in 2015 to 64.7 per cent in 2022 (ibid.).

This working paper aims to synthesise evidence on pathways out of rural poverty for the Government of Zambia and other stakeholders. It uses mixed-methods evidence on rural poverty graduation pathways in Zambia, categorising these pathways into three groups: (1) chronically and extremely poor people escaping poverty, (2) moderately poor people escaping poverty, and (3) vulnerable non-poor people maintaining their escape from poverty. This report uses recent quantitative data from 2015 to early 2022, capturing the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact on mobility. The life history qualitative analysis extends this further through to November 2023, incorporating the effects of inflation, and the new administration’s social protection and promotion policies. Thus, we can more effectively cover the role of social protection and exit ramps for those receiving social cash transfers (SCTs) while taking into account the most recent impact of climate change on these rural pathways out of poverty.

Written by Lucia da Corta and Richard Bwalya

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Let's go double dipping! Supporting Growth from Below through Cash+

In Zambia, economic growth is primarily driven by large-scale, formal investments in sectors such as minerals, tourism, and services. However, these sectors employ relatively few people and have a limited impact on overall poverty reduction due to weak economic multipliers.

Consequently, Zambia needs complementary efforts focused on “Growth from Below”, small- scale, informal investments at the household level to effectively reduce poverty, particularly in an economy characterised by high inequality and a heavy reliance on minerals. According to the World Bank (2025), Zambia’s economic growth has a minimal effect on poverty alleviation, meaning that even substantial economic growth results in only modest reductions in poverty levels. While governments typically prioritise large-scale investments, a balanced approach that promotes both Growth from Above (GfA) and Growth from Below (GfB) is essential for inclusive and sustainable poverty reduction.

Furthermore, although the minerals sector is economically significant, it inadequately contributes to government revenues due to externalization of financial flows and opaque financial practices on which significant Zambian institutional capacity has been built (Inter-governmental Forum, 2025). Mineral companies are sometimes able to negotiate special agreements with the Ministry of Finance and Planning to minimise or evade taxes and royalties, as in the recent dropping of a 15% export tax. Addressing these transparency and taxation issues, which have long been a concern for the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), is crucial to ensure that revenues from mineral wealth are effectively directed towards supporting broader economic initiatives that can genuinely benefit all Zambians.

Written by Andrew Shepherd

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Political Economy Analysis of Pro-poor Policies in Zambia

In 2024, Zambia experienced the driest agricultural season in over 40 years, with significant crop losses, increased livestock deaths and, consequently, worsening poverty. Over 9 million people in 84 out of 116 districts were affected. Rising inflation impeded access to food for vulnerable households Being dependent on hydropower, the drought resulted in an enormous power deficit. In 2024 and early 2025 Zambia experienced power cuts of 21 hours a day, disproportionately affecting small and medium-sized enterprises that cannot afford solar power or generators.

A debt crisis has exacerbated these climate-related challenges. Zambian debt peaked at 140 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020. Along with Covid-19, debt service pressures resulted in Zambia becoming the first African country to default on its external debt service obligations in November 2020, missing a US$42.5 million interest payment on a Eurobond. In addition, Zambia has been hit by three droughts in the past decade. Due to the deaths of two presidents in office (in 2008 and 2014), Zambia has also seen high levels of political turnover, which has impacted policy consistency.

The multiple crises Zambia has faced have had political repercussions, as economic decline has created discontent. The economic effects of crises have further strained the kwacha and resulted in increased inflationary pressures.2 Zambia is under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme that has strict benchmarks when it comes to subsidies for fuel, electricity and fertiliser. This programme ends in August 2025, opening various policy options, though it will lack the fiscal space which gave President Levy Mwanawasa’s free reign after the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative in 2006. The forthcoming elections in August 2026 will be tightly contested; if the opposition can unite behind one candidate, it will also influence policy decisions.

Within this context, this working paper discusses the following questions: How can poverty reduction experience a step change in Zambia? What are the political and economic conditions? And what can research tell the competing political parties and how best to achieve change The paper will briefly focus on the anti-poverty measures undertaken by the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) government (2011–21), which started as a leftist movement, before zooming into the current United Party for National Development (UPND) regime, which is more liberal in outlook. It then focuses on the political economy of current pro-poor programming. The paper is based on a literature review, unpublished reports, and interviews and interactions with relevant stakeholders (government officials, civil society organisations, think tanks and analysts).

Written by Marja Hinfelaar, SAIPAR

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Financial Inclusion and CSA Adoption - Enhancing the Resilience of Smallholder Farmers to Climate Change in Zambia

Financial inclusion is essential to empower smallholder farmers in Zambia, particularly women, enabling them to adopt climate-smart agriculture (CSA) practices and build resilience against climate variability. However, access to financial services, such as credit, savings and insurance is limited, impeding farmers’ ability to invest in CSA practices that require significant upfront costs and risk management. This paper explores the challenges and opportunities in promoting financial inclusion for smallholder farmers in Zambia, emphasising the importance of tailored financial tools to address the unique needs of rural communities, especially the most vulnerable groups.

Written by Arthur Moonga, Andrew Shepherd and Lucia da Corta

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Evidence From Cash Plus Programmes: Lessons for Zambia

Social protection strategies, and cash transfer programmes in particular, have been on the rise globally since the early 2000s. By 2019, 35 African countries had adopted a national social protection policy or strategy. Cash plus approaches (including graduation programmes) addressing a wider range of socioeconomic outcomes emerged more recently and have expanded quickly. The Zambian government approved a cash plus approach in 2022, and a range of cash plus interventions are already being implemented. Exploring cash plus experiences and evidence from other countries is key to informing programme development, with a focus on what we can learn from these contexts that is relevant for Zambia. This includes ‘what works’ in terms of different combinations of cash plus components as well as how to deliver through national and local governance structures.

Written by Roz Price, Kate Pruce and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler

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The Politics of Cash Plus in Zambia

Social protection is now well-established on the policy agenda in Zambia, including various cash plus initiatives and social protection responses to shocks, such as the recent drought. This paper considers lessons from the success story of expanding social cash transfers in Zambia and applies these to the country’s current social protection context. Using a 3I(R) approach to political economy analysis, which focuses on institutions, interests, ideas and resources, the paper proposes a series of conclusions and recommendations drawn from this analysis. These include the value of consistency and persistence in promoting a policy idea, ideally through a strong policy coalition; the importance of connecting policy and political constituencies; the role of political motivation and suggestions for alignment with government ideas and priorities. There is currently political momentum for cash plus, as well as a growing evidence base both globally and within Zambia, which now needs to be translated into financial commitment. Establishing a more comprehensive suite of social protection programmes for households with and without labour capacity can contribute to upward mobility out of poverty and building resilience to future shocks in Zambia.

Written by Kate Pruce

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Dimensions of Urban Poverty in Zambia: Insights, Challenges and Policy Directions

This study, conducted between May and July 2024, provides empirical evidence on urban poverty among men and women in Lusaka and Ndola. Using a qualitative case study approach, it engaged diverse stakeholders – including informal sector workers, local government officials, district social welfare officers, and civil society representatives – to offer a comprehensive understanding of urban poverty and inform policy recommendations. Data was collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews, ensuring a multi-stakeholder perspective on the lived realities and structural drivers of urban poverty. 

Despite Zambia’s resource wealth and its status as one of Africa’s most urbanised nations, urban poverty is widespread. With 40 per cent of Zambia’s 19.6 million people residing in cities, poverty affects 31.9 per cent of urban dwellers – an increase from 23.4 per cent in 2015. This trend underscores the urgent need for targeted antipoverty strategies. While many individuals display resilience, they face persistent challenges such as income instability, food insecurity, inadequate health care, limited educational opportunities and poor housing conditions, all of which undermine their wellbeing and economic agency. 

Authored by Cleopas Gabriel Sambo

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Rural Pathways out of Poverty in Zambia

Poverty rates are high in Zambia, with the incidence of poverty having increased from 54.4 per cent in 2015 to 60.0 per cent in 2022 (ZamStats 2023). This overall trend hides variations according to area of residence and socio-demographic characteristics. For example, poverty is largely a rural rather than an urban phenomenon, with the incidence of poverty in rural areas estimated at 78.8 per cent compared with 31.9 per cent for urban areas as of 2022 (ibid.). Poverty is also more prevalent among female-headed households (83.4 per cent) compared with male-headed households (77.3 per cent). Comparisons between 2015 and 2022 shows that the proportionate increase in poverty rates was higher among female-headed households (4.5 per cent) compared with male-headed households (0.7 per cent). Poverty in Zambia is also associated with the livelihood strategies that households pursue. For instance, poverty is highest among those employed in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors, increasing from 63.9 per cent in 2015 to 64.7 per cent in 2022 (ibid.).

This working paper aims to synthesise evidence on pathways out of rural poverty for the Government of Zambia and other stakeholders. It uses mixed-methods evidence on rural poverty graduation pathways in Zambia, categorising these pathways into three groups: (1) chronically and extremely poor people escaping poverty, (2) moderately poor people escaping poverty, and (3) vulnerable non-poor people maintaining their escape from poverty. This report uses recent quantitative data from 2015 to early 2022, capturing the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact on mobility. The life history qualitative analysis extends this further through to November 2023, incorporating the effects of inflation, and the new administration’s social protection and promotion policies. Thus, we can more effectively cover the role of social protection and exit ramps for those receiving social cash transfers (SCTs) while taking into account the most recent impact of climate change on these rural pathways out of poverty.

Authored by Lucia da Corta, Richard Bwalya

Click here to read the full report

Evidence From Cash Plus Programmes: Lessons for Zambia

Social protection strategies, and cash transfer programmes in particular, have been on the rise globally since the early 2000s. By 2019, 35 African countries had adopted a national social protection policy or strategy. Cash plus approaches (including graduation programmes) addressing a wider range of socioeconomic outcomes emerged more recently and have expanded quickly. The Zambian government approved a cash plus approach in 2022, and a range of cash plus interventions are already being implemented. Exploring cash plus experiences and evidence from other countries is key to informing programme development, with a focus on what we can learn from these contexts that is relevant for Zambia. This includes ‘what works’ in terms of different combinations of cash plus components as well as how to deliver through national and local governance structures.

Authored by Roz Price, Kate Pruce and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler

Click here to read the full report

Political Economy Analysis of Pro-poor Policies in Zambia

In 2024, Zambia experienced the driest agricultural season in over 40 years, with significant crop losses, increased livestock deaths and, consequently, worsening poverty. Over 9 million people in 84 out of 116 districts were affected. Rising inflation impeded access to food for vulnerable households Being dependent on hydropower, the drought resulted in an enormous power deficit. In 2024 and early 2025 Zambia experienced power cuts of 21 hours a day, disproportionately affecting small and medium-sized enterprises that cannot afford solar power or generators.

A debt crisis has exacerbated these climate-related challenges. Zambian debt peaked at 140 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020. Along with Covid-19, debt service pressures resulted in Zambia becoming the first African country to default on its external debt service obligations in November 2020, missing a US$42.5 million interest payment on a Eurobond. In addition, Zambia has been hit by three droughts in the past decade. Due to the deaths of two presidents in office (in 2008 and 2014), Zambia has also seen high levels of political turnover, which has impacted policy consistency.

The multiple crises Zambia has faced have had political repercussions, as economic decline has created discontent. The economic effects of crises have further strained the kwacha and resulted in increased inflationary pressures.2 Zambia is under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme that has strict benchmarks when it comes to subsidies for fuel, electricity and fertiliser. This programme ends in August 2025, opening various policy options, though it will lack the fiscal space which gave President Levy Mwanawasa’s free reign after the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative in 2006. The forthcoming elections in August 2026 will be tightly contested; if the opposition can unite behind one candidate, it will also influence policy decisions.

Within this context, this working paper discusses the following questions: How can poverty reduction experience a step change in Zambia? What are the political and economic conditions? And what can research tell the competing political parties and how best to achieve change The paper will briefly focus on the anti-poverty measures undertaken by the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) government (2011–21), which started as a leftist movement, before zooming into the current United Party for National Development (UPND) regime, which is more liberal in outlook. It then focuses on the political economy of current pro-poor programming. The paper is based on a literature review, unpublished reports, and interviews and interactions with relevant stakeholders (government officials, civil society organisations, think tanks and analysts).

Authored by Marja Hinfelaar

Click here to read the full report

Let's go double dipping! Supporting Growth from Below through Cash+

In Zambia, economic growth is primarily driven by large-scale, formal investments in sectors such as minerals, tourism, and services. However, these sectors employ relatively few people and have a limited impact on overall poverty reduction due to weak economic multipliers.

Consequently, Zambia needs complementary efforts focused on “Growth from Below”, small- scale, informal investments at the household level to effectively reduce poverty, particularly in an economy characterised by high inequality and a heavy reliance on minerals. According to the World Bank (2025), Zambia’s economic growth has a minimal effect on poverty alleviation, meaning that even substantial economic growth results in only modest reductions in poverty levels. While governments typically prioritise large-scale investments, a balanced approach that promotes both Growth from Above (GfA) and Growth from Below (GfB) is essential for inclusive and sustainable poverty reduction.

Furthermore, although the minerals sector is economically significant, it inadequately contributes to government revenues due to externalization of financial flows and opaque financial practices on which significant Zambian institutional capacity has been built (Inter-governmental Forum, 2025). Mineral companies are sometimes able to negotiate special agreements with the Ministry of Finance and Planning to minimise or evade taxes and royalties, as in the recent dropping of a 15% export tax. Addressing these transparency and taxation issues, which have long been a concern for the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), is crucial to ensure that revenues from mineral wealth are effectively directed towards supporting broader economic initiatives that can genuinely benefit all Zambians.

Authored by Andrew Shepherd

Click here to read the full policy brief

National Report - Zambian Poverty Dynamics and Climate Resilience: A Growing Policy Agenda Through a Period of Crises

This report synthesises the key research findings of the Zambia Poverty Dynamics programme since the last national report in 2021, whose key findings and recommendations are summarised in Box 1.1. Many dimensions have remained the same; however, the main changes include: (1) a dramatic reversal in urban poverty reduction; (2) a very significant increase in new policy developments, especially in human development, although not yet in ‘growth from below’, but significant progress was achieved in fisheries with the return of fishing ban periods each year on major rivers and lakes to allow fish stocks to recover, laying the foundation for income growth in fishing.

This report starts by laying out which policy interventions have become significantly more visible and impactful since the last report, presenting the evidence from quantitative and qualitative research, and focusing on governance and implementation issues. Policy interventions are even more critical to poverty reduction and climate resilience in the Zambian context, it is argued, because of the ‘enclave’ nature of the dominant mining sector, which leads economic growth, at least when commodity prices are high (Pijuan Sala and Tudela Pye 2024), and which the current government wishes to grow rapidly. The majority of Zambians are employed or self-employed in comparatively low-productivity sectors, agriculture and services, which are generally disconnected from mining and other formal sectors such as tourism. Resulting high levels of inequality do not generate the market demand for micro- and small businesses’ outputs and services, leaving these with low investment and productivity. But they do generate the need and potential for redistribution through taxation, even if fiscal resources are for the moment heavily constrained by debt servicing.

As a result of these high inequalities, growth has not carried everyone with it. Therefore, only interventions will assist poor and vulnerable people to improve their life chances, until the pattern of growth changes and begins to make a contribution. So far the most successful interventions have been in human development. Their success has been extremely valuable but has not yet laid the foundations for more inclusive growth from below, which is necessary if poverty is to be sustainably reduced. Both of these – human development and growth from below – are required to enable sustained escapes from poverty or ‘graduations’, which are the objective of anti-poverty policy.

The report goes on to briefly assess the effects of the multiple crises that have assailed Zambia in the past five years, with an analysis of impacts on urban populations, and differentiating between extremely poor and moderately poor households, and men- and women-headed households. It also looks at policy responses to these crises, including disaster risk management, and raises the question of how to respond in the likely event that such crisis-prone times continue. This is followed by a closely related discussion on whether and how more widespread resilience to climate change might be achieved. The analysis is gendered throughout, and concludes with key policy and programming recommendations.


Authored by Andrew Shepherd, Richard Bwalya, Antony Chapoto, Lucia da Corta, Marta Eichsteller, Vidya Diwakar, Marja Hinfelaar, Mary Lubungu, Arthur Moonga, Brian Mulenga, Kate Pruce, Joseph Simbaya

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Empowered Worldviews: Assessing the persistence of psychosocial intervention effects in Zambia

Evidence on the persistence of psychosocial outcomes of interventions over the medium and long term, and in the face of shocks and stressors, is limited. We examined the extent to which empowerment associated with a psychosocial, faith-based approach, Empowered Worldview (EWV) persisted 3–5 years post-delivery of the intervention in Zambia among smallholder farmers. The EWV intervention in Zambia was delivered as part of THRIVE, an integrated livelihoods programme. We followed a previous study to disaggregate individual-level empowerment associated with EWV into three domains: internal (which relates to ‘power within’), localised (typically participation and access), and structural (e.g. institutional, environmental, and social structures).

To explore the persistence of EWV effects on empowerment, we used mixed methods and longitudinal data collected in 2020 and 2023, which were the midline and endline points of the THRIVE programme. Empirically, we used descriptive and regression analysis to compare internal and localised empowerment levels between the survey rounds (2020 and 2023) across study groups – including groups that received EWV before and after 2020 – and to the control group. We also re-interviewed a subset of EWV participants interviewed in 2020 to understand how empowerment has changed at the individual level over time.

Life history diagram for Beatrice.

The results show levels of internal empowerment associated with the EWV intervention persisted between the midline and endline surveys, especially when combined with THRIVE livelihood interventions. At the midline, 80.0 per cent of THRIVE with EWV participants were empowered, compared to 82.3 per cent at the endline. In contrast, 72.6 per cent and 73.07 per cent of the control sample participants were empowered at the midline and the endline, respectively. Quantitative results further show that localised empowerment significantly improved between survey rounds among participants who received EWV training and is positively associated with internal empowerment, consistent with literature that suggests localised enablers (supporting social environments) are crucial to sustaining internal empowerment. The qualitative data shows that persistent internal and localised empowerment was observed mostly among households in the non-poor wellbeing category, suggesting that additional interventions are needed to reach the poorest participants. Results also show internal and localised empowerment are positively associated with indicators of household resilience. We conclude the paper with recommendations for programming.

Life history diagram for Edward

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For further insights on the first phase of the study, click here

Zambia Poverty Dynamics Research

Front page of policy brief

The policy agenda proposed here builds on good measures already taken by the Government of Zambia in education, social protection, debt relief and macroeconomic management, and addresses the challenges that remain in creating a more prosperous and equal Zambia.

The rate of poverty reduction slowed in Zambia during the 2010s, and especially with the 2019 drought and policy responses to the pandemic. A high level of rural chronic poverty is associated with farming and other natural resource-based occupations, suggesting that natural resource management requires significant policy attention. Surprisingly, chronic poverty is highest in eastern and southern Zambia, despite the maize- and livestock-based economics in those regions.

In the context of continuing climate change, risks to natural resource-based occupations are increasing rapidly, which keeps people poor. Sustained escapes from poverty have not exceeded downward mobility into poverty. Urbanised provinces have typically done better than rural ones in reducing extreme poverty and deprivation. 

Zambia’s debt servicing obligations and low economic growth have meant that public expenditure is constrained, though a little less in 2023 than in 2022 when reduced debt servicing allowed increased allocations to education and social protection budgets among others. Significantly greater public expenditure will be needed to recapture a higher rate of poverty reduction. However, it is also important that expenditure goes to items that will reach and benefit poor and vulnerable people. 

This policy brief recommends a series measures, several of which are already underway, and within a sound macroeconomic management framework that has been put in place.

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Impacts of the Government of Zambia’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic on Poverty

COVID-19 tested the social welfare system that successive governments have been building in Zambia over the last two decades. Zambia had one of the highest poverty rates in the world going into the COVID-19 pandemic as well as overlapping vulnerabilities related to climate change, macroeconomic instability, and high external debt. These and other challenges exposed many people living above the poverty line to impoverishment and pushed households living in poverty further towards destitution.

Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), the Chronic Poverty Advisory Network (CPAN), and the Institute of Social and Economic Research (INESOR) have been monitoring the impacts of the pandemic on people living in or near poverty in Zambia since early 2021 in three districts – Lusaka, Kabwe and Chipata - about the reach and impact of these policies. This policy brief reviews the Government of Zambia’s key policies to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on people living in or near poverty and summarises insights from people affected by these policies about what they have achieved and how they can be improved.

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